Conscious intentionality

The intentionality of consciousness is the claim that consciousness is always directed toward something other than itself, while retaining a non-objectifying awareness of its own activity. In Sartre’s account, this structure is not an optional feature of thought: pre-reflective consciousness is the basis from which reflective knowledge and the Cartesian cogito become possible.

Intentionality and being

Consciousness is described as a being whose own being is in question insofar as it implies a being other than itself. Its relation to an object is therefore not an added step after consciousness has first established itself as an inner thing. Consciousness exists as directed beyond itself, toward what it is conscious of, and its being is implicated in that relation.

Sartre’s formulation joins intentional directedness to the question of existence. Consciousness is not presented as a sealed container of contents; it is a way of being that reaches an object and, in doing so, is implicitly aware of its own relation to that object. This makes intentionality central to his account of consciousness rather than merely a description of one mental operation.

The pre-reflective basis

Unreflective consciousness, also called non-thetic or non-positional self-consciousness, is the pre-reflective cogito. It does not yet constitute knowledge of consciousness as an object. Instead, while consciousness is occupied with an object, it implicitly apprehends itself as consciousness of that object. Self-awareness is present, but it is not a separate act of inspecting an inner self.

This distinction explains the priority Sartre gives to the pre-reflective cogito over the Cartesian cogito. The Cartesian formulation depends on a more basic consciousness that is already occurring before reflection makes consciousness itself a topic. Reflection can take consciousness as its object, but it does not create the underlying awareness on which that act depends.

Reflection and its distinction

Reflective consciousness is also called thetic or positional self-consciousness. Unlike unreflective consciousness, it posits consciousness as an object and is associated with reflection. The distinction is not between awareness and total absence of awareness: both modes belong to consciousness, but only the reflective mode makes consciousness itself the explicit object of an act.

Sartre also distinguishes types of consciousness by the psychic objects toward which they are directed, including pain-consciousness and shame-consciousness. Such examples preserve the basic intentional pattern while showing that consciousness can be specified by what it is consciousness of. Together, the two distinctions locate intentionality at the foundation of conscious life: it accounts both for consciousness’s directedness toward objects and for the implicit self-awareness that precedes reflective knowledge.